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ABSTRACT 
 
A central feature of innovation systems is that innovation arises from interaction between organizational 
units. This requires ‘cognitive distance’ that is sufficiently large to yield novelty of combinations, but 
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especially to small firms, are identified and discussed. There is a problem not only of expressing tacit 
knowledge, but also of absorbing new knowledge when it needs to replace existing tacit knowledge. 
Next to issues of learning or competence development there are also issues of governance, in the 
management of relational risk of dependence and spillover. The analysis yields a number of tasks and 
functions for regional systems of innovation.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Next to the production of innovation its diffusion requires attention. As is well known from the 
innovation literature, innovation entails much more than R&D, and includes design, marketing, test 
production, and service. When only formal R&D is measured, this yields a considerable under-
estimation of more informal development activities in small firms. When we take this into account, 
there is considerable evidence that small firms participate less in R&D than large ones, but when they 
do, they do so at a greater intensity and efficiency. In the adoption of new technology produced by 
others small firms tend to lag behind. National prosperity results not so much from the production of 
innovations, but from their widespread adoption among firms. Special attention is needed to small 
firms, because of their share in national economies and the special problems they face. In modern 
economies small firms make up more than 90% of all firms, and some 60% of employment, in the 
private sector. For a survey of evidence and explanation, see Nooteboom (1994). 
It should be noted that innovation and diffusion go hand in hand. In order to innovate one 
needs to adopt knowledge of markets, technologies and appropriate forms of organization. Often 
adoption requires a certain amount of re-invention in the adopting firm, and modification for 
implementation in a variety of organizational forms. Small firms operate differently from large firms, 
and exhibit a greater variety of organization. Innovation is increasingly seen as emerging from 
interaction between different firms or organizational units, with different, complementary knowledge 
and competencies. If all this is true, then for understanding innovation and diffusion we must 
understand knowledge transfer between organizations. An important task for regional systems of 
innovation (RIS) is to identify problems in knowledge transfer and solve them. That is the topic of this 
paper. 
 One caveat here is that it is tricky to generalize about small firms. They show a large variety of 
motives, objectives, organization, and modes of operation. People enter self-employment because of 
unemployment, discrimination on the job market, social pressure to take over from a self-employed 
father, maladjustment in the bureaucracy of a large firm and inability to conform to authority, the 
challenge of realizing a new idea that finds no aceptance in a large firm, the desire to be independent, 
and the identification of a ‘hole in the market’.  Their objectives vary: not only growth and profits, but 
often also independence, small scale, informality and idiosyncrasy of operations as part or even the 
whole of their objective. There is also a large variety of educational background and experience, which 
affects the ability of small firms to understand and absorb new technology (‘absorptive capacity’, cf. 
Cohen and Levinthal 1990), which is crucial in the present analysis. Idiosyncrasy of operation is viable 
to the extent that the firm is not subjected to the rigorous selection mechanism of stock markets and the 
resulting demands on performance, because capital and ownership are to some degree in the hands of 
the entrepreneur or his family. Such variety of goals, background and operation is relevant here, 
because possibilities and limitations in innovation and adoption depend on them. For example, an 
entrepreneur who emerged from a traditional craft environment, often continuing a family tradition, 
with limited formal training, faces more obstacles, especially in absorptive capacity, than a university 
graduate who escapes from a large bureaucratic firm to spin-off a firm of his own. 
 A second caveat is that the notion of firm size as a distinguishing characteristic is becoming 
obsolete as a result of the development of a ‘network economy’. Small firms can to a large extent 
compensate for weaknesses of small size in linkages with other firms, in networks or ‘industrial 
districts’, based on the sharing of resources, division of labour and complementarity of assets and 
competencies, while maintaining flexibility in the configuration of activities in the network. Here we 
see markets mimicking organization. On the other hand, large firms can mitigate problems of 
bureaucracy and inertia by decentralization of activities across highly autonomous units, in intra-firm 
networks of a ‘virtual firm’. The classic example is 3M company, where development is allowed to take 
place in highly autonomous ‘skunk works’, which may even be in competition with each other. Here, 
we see a firm mimicking markets. Both intra- and inter-firm networks are facilitated by information- 
and communication technology. However, in spite of this blurring of boundaries between large and 
small firms, we can still recognize the phenomenon of the independent entrepreneur and his behaviour 
in the adoption of new technology. 
 A third caveat is that knowledge transfer should not be analyzed only in terms of competence. 
There is also an indispensable dimension of governance. As argued by Williamson (1999) there is a 
need to connect the research areas of competence and governance. In governance, we are faced with 
issues of ‘relational risk’: risk of  ‘spillover’ (leakage) of knowledge to competitors, and risk of 
extortion or ‘hold-up’ (to use that term from transaction cost economics, TCE). This is especially 
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important for small firms, who often have limited strategic options, with a relatively high risk of one-
sided dependence in relations with large organizations. Also, customization of products to niche 
markets is often a viable and attractive option for small firms, but this can entail the need to engage in 
investments that are ‘transaction specific’. According to TCE, this is a cause of dependence, resulting in 
a risk of hold-up. Also, often the absorptive capacity of small firms is small relative to that of large 
firms, so that in collaboration in the joint production of knowledge the advantage can be one-sided, 
with the large firms expropriating the advantage of joint knowledge production. The stimulation of 
knowledge transfer to and from small firms that is naive with respect to these issues of governance can 
cause more harm than good. 
I recognize, and indeed share, the well-known criticism of TCE that it does not take innovation 
and learning into account, and that it neglects the role of trust next to opportunism. Therefore I employ 
a wider theory of relations, which does, however, retain some elements from TCE, such as the notions 
of specific investments, hold-up, and hostages (Nooteboom 1999a). 
 This article proceeds as follows. For the analysis of knowledge transfer we need an underlying 
theory of knowledge. The theory used here is based on an interactionist, constructivist perspective. It 
connects well with the central notion of absorptive capacity, and yields the notion of a firm as a 
‘focusing device’ and the notion of ‘cognitive distance’ between firms (Nooteboom 1999a). It is 
outlined in the second section. Issues of governance are summarized in the third section. Problems of 
knowledge transfer are identified in the fourth section. In particular, account is taken of the degree to 
which existing knowledge in the firm and the new knowledge to be transferred to the firm are tacit 
(rather than codified). In the knowledge literature it is customary to recognise the problems involved in 
the transfer of tacit knowledge, but here it is shown that tacitness of existing knowledge on the part of 
the recipient also creates an obstacle, due to a limitation of absorptive capacity. Section five gives a 
discussion of solutions of the problems of knowledge transfer. The final, sixth section gives 
conclusions.  
 The main purpose of the paper is to specify and solve problems in the transfer of knowledge, 
in particular to small firms. That is an issue for innovation policy in general and for RIS in particular. 
The analysis suggests institutions that may have to be provided in RIS. 
 
 
2. KNOWLEDGE AND COGNITIVE DISTANCE 
 
It is a truism to say that information is not the same as knowledge. To become knowledge, information 
needs to be interpreted in a cognitive framework. Here, I employ a theory of knowledge and language 
which is based on the view, adopted from a stream of thought in cognitive psychology, that intelligence 
is internalized action (Piaget 1970, 1974, Vygotsky 1962). It is linked to ‘symbolic interactionism’ in 
sociology (G.H. Mead 1934, 1982). In the organisational literature this has been absorbed by Weick 
(1979, 1995). This leads to the ‘situated action’ view rather than the dominant ‘computational 
representational’ view in cognitive science. The situated action view entails that knowledge and 
meaning are disambiguated, complemented and shifted in specific contexts. As argued elsewhere 
(Nooteboom 2000), I propose that this view of knowledge provides the basis for a fundamental 
explanatory perspective of ‘methodological interactionism’ that can replace both the methodological 
individualism of economics and the methodological collectivism of (some) sociology, to provide a basis 
for a unified science of behaviour. I take ‘cognition’ in a wide sense, including perception, 
interpretation and evaluation, hence including value judgements.  
The theory of knowledge that I employ states that cognition takes place on the basis of 
cognitive categories that are developed in interaction with the physical and social environment. Those 
cognitive categories form our perceptions, interpretations (assignment of logical and causal 
connections) and evaluations (value judgements). Thus, they constitute our absorptive capacity. This 
precludes objective knowledge (or at least any certain knowledge whether or to what extent knowledge 
is objective). Our absorptive capacity is context-dependent, cumulative and path-dependent. It is 
context-dependent because it is built on previous experience, in specific contexts. It is cumulative and 
path-dependent because previous experience determines the cognitive structures by which we assimilate 
new experience. 
This view does not necessarily entail radical relativism or subjectivism. If we construct 
knowledge from interaction with our environment (of which it is reasonable to assume that it does 
exist), this entails that reality is at least a material cause of our knowledge: our knowledge is ‘embodied 
realism’ (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). Also, to the extent that we share the environment in which our 
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knowledge develops, there will be similarities of cognition, which yields a basis for inter-subjective 
debate.  
The reverse of this coin is, of course, that to the extent that people have developed their 
knowledge in different environments, and have not been in communication with each other or each 
other’s environment, cognition will differ: there will be greater or lesser ‘cognitive distance’ 
(Nooteboom 1992, 1999a). I do not wish to imply that cognition is any simple, one-dimensional 
construct that allows for simple measurement of distance. The notion of cognitive distance is closely 
related to the notion of cognitive variety, but it is more specific. It indicates that people do not just have 
different thoughts, but that they have different abilities of perception, interpretation and evaluation, and 
thereby see the world differently, as a function of their experience.  
Cognitive distance yields both an opportunity and a problem. The opportunity is that contact 
with others gives us an opportunity to escape from the myopia of our personal cognitive construction. A 
problem, however, is that the greater the distance, i.e. the less people share cognitive categories, the 
more difficult it is to cross it, i.e. to understand the actions and expressions of a partner. Thus there is 
some optimal cognitive distance: large enough for partners to tell each other something new, and small 
enough for comprehension. Absorptive capacity is part of our ability to cross cognitive distance, i.e. to 
connect different cognitive categories. The other part is communicative capacity, or the ability to help 
others understand what we do or say. Note that there is a difference between crossing cognitive distance 
and reducing it. Reduction of cognitive distance entails a convergence of  cognitive frameworks, 
whereby people start to think alike. Crossing cognitive distance entails that one develops the ability to 
understand what others do or say, and to help them understand one’s own actions and utterances, 
without thereby thinking alike. Neither absorptive capacity nor communicative capacity is fixed. They 
depend on experience and the accumulation of knowledge and skill. For a further elaboration see 
Nooteboom (2000). 
The analysis leads to the notion of organization, or a community of practice, as a focusing 
device (Nooteboom 1992). An important function of organization is to create sufficient focus, i.e. 
alignment of cognitive categories, for people to achieve a common purpose. This is related to the 
notions, in the organizational literature, of an organization as a sensemaking system (Weick 1979, 
1995), system of shared meanings (Smircich 1983), or interpretation system (Choo 1998). Arguably, 
this is more fundamental than the function of a firm to reduce transaction costs, as TCE proposes. Now, 
focusing, here again, yields a problem of myopia, by which organizations may fail to see or adequately 
interpret potential opportunities and threats to its existence. To compensate for myopia, organizations 
need outside partners for complementary cognition, or ‘external economy of cognitive scope’ 
(Nooteboom 1992).  
The sharpness or narrowness of the focus depends on whether the organization, or part of it, 
needs to concentrate more on efficient exploitation (utilization of existing resources and competencies, 
including cognitive competencies) or on exploration (development of new competencies). Efficient 
exploitation requires a sharper focus, with more unity of perception and interpretation for the sake of 
efficient co-ordination. It requires division of labour, with clear and sharp linkages, on the basis of 
clear, unambiguous meanings and standards. Exploration, on the other hand, entails crossing and 
shifting boundaries, linkages and meanings, for the sake of finding Schumpeterian ‘novel 
combinations’. 
The literature on organizational learning states that organizations need to do both: to combine 
exploitation and exploration. This is not a trivial task. How can they be combined? One can think of 
several solutions, and one can observe a variety of attempts. The innovation literature proposes that 
exploration yields novel forms, which converge on a dominant design, which is used as a basis for 
exploitation. Elsewhere (Nooteboom 2000) I proposed that next the novelty is carried into new 
applications, in which it is challenged with failures, which motivate adaptations and yield opportunities 
and inspiration for experimenting with novel combinations. Here, exploration is combined with 
exploitation. Novel elements put the existing architecture under strain. That architecture constrains the 
utilization of potential of novel elements, and pressure arises to engage in more radical architectural 
innovation (Henderson and Clark 1990), and here we are at the beginning of the cycle again. 
Thus, up to a point exploitation and exploration can be combined. However, exploitation 
remains connected with a more or less integrated structure, in the sense of strict linkages between 
elements, or fixed standards, for some activities. Exploration requires more or less disintegration, with 
rupture of existing connections and standards.  
One solution is to let an organization fluctuate between integration and disintegration, as 
needed for development to proceed, and we often observe that (ATT, Apple). That exerts great 
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demands and stress on an organization. It is particularly difficult  if the organization has a portfolio of 
activities in different stages of development, because then the organisation would have to be integrated 
for the one product and disintegrated for the other.  A solution can then be a network of organizations, 
or of highly autonomous parts of organizations. That may be the underlying reason for the emergence of 
the ‘network economy’. This connects with the need, identified earlier, to combine cognitive distance, 
for the sake of exploration, with cognitive proximity, for the sake of exploitation. 
More specifically, in this context there are three arguments for network structures. The first is 
to maintain autonomy of participants, each with his own set of activities and connections, to maintain 
cognitive distance. The second is the argument of strategic flexibility: the novel combinations of 
innovation are achieved by variable configurations of participants in the network. There is no guarantee 
of inclusion. Participants are included or excluded according to the viability of configurations. The 
third argument is that participants can specialize in a stage of innovation. Some units concentrate on 
exploitation and others on exploration, and activities are shifted between the units as they move through 
the cycle of development. It can be an attractive position to act as orchestrator of activities in such a 
network. Of that we also see several examples (Benetton, Nike). 
The above specifies the importance of transfer of knowledge between firms for innovation. I 
propose that this yields a way of looking at RIS: 
 
RIS1: For a RIS to function (i.e. produce and utilize innovations), it needs to combine exploitation and 
exploration. For the first it needs organizational units that each have sufficient focus to ensure 
efficient utilization of their specialized competencies. For exploration, there should be 
organizational units with cognitive distance that is large enough to ensure variety of cognition 
but not too large to block mutual understanding and relevance. 
 
 As indicated  before, absorptive capacity is not fixed. When the knowledge involved is 
codified, absorptive capacity can be increased and maintained by more formal forms of learning, such 
as R&D. Often, when firms outsource certain activities, they maintain R&D in that area in order to 
maintain absorptive capacity (Granstrand, Patel and Pavitt 1997). When knowledge is tacit, I propose 
that absorptive and communicative capacity depend more on cumulative experience in absorbing and 
communicating tacit knowledge, and developing shared, tacit cognitive frameworks, with a variety of 
partners.  
 
RIS2: The performance of a RIS is enhanced by the ability of firms to communicate and to absorb tacit 
knowledge. This enhances the ability to cross cognitive distance. That ability enables one to 
deal with larger cognitive distances. That yields a greater variety of knowledge sources, which 
enhances innovation.  
 
Inter-firm relations, networks and regional systems can get bogged down in inertia and lack of 
exploration when cognitive distance gets too short, i.e. when there is too much overlap of cognitive 
frameworks. Here, social capital degenerates into social liability (Gabbay and Leenders 1999). This can 
happen when relations become too exclusive and durable. Then cognitive distance will reduce: units 
will come to perceive and think alike.  
 
RIS3: To prevent the disappearance of cognitive distance in the long run, RIS should facilitate the 
influx of new participants in the network or region, relations with units outside the region, or 
for frequent excursions of members of the network or region to other regions, in order to 
maintain cognitive distance. 
 
 
3. LEARNING AND GOVERNANCE  
 
Above, I argued that to maintain innovative potential RIS must have linkages not only within but also 
outside the region. As proposed by Oinas and Malecki (2000), we should think not so much in terms of 
knowledge at a location, but of movements of knowledge across space, within and between regions, in 
what they call ‘spatial systems of innovation’. The argument mirrors the discussion of the firm as a 
focusing device. A RIS also may require some focus, for efficient exploitation, but this entails a risk of 
myopia, and to compensate for this an RIS needs external linkages at greater cognitive distance.  
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 As indicated in the introduction, one challenge is to combine competence and 
governance perspectives. We need to look not only at what people are able to do, and what is useful in 
networks of firms, but also what motivates people, and what risks there lie in relations, and how they 
are to be governed. There are two kinds of relational risk. One is risk of dependence, resulting from the 
loss of value that would ensue from switching to another partner. This yields a ‘hold-up risk’, as 
explained in TCE. A second is the risk of spillover of knowledge concerning one’s core competencies, 
on which competitive advantage depends. To the extent that a relation with a partner is more intense, 
and entails extensive information exchange, there may be a risk that such sensitive information spills 
over via the partner to a competitor. From this perspective of governance, for the control of relational 
risk, there are arguments for a certain durability in order to ensure that specific investments are 
recouped. There may also be an argument for a certain exclusiveness of relations, to reduce the risk of 
spillover. 
Instruments for governance can be summarized as follows. For a more detailed discussion, see 
Nooteboom (1999a). First, one can avoid the dependence that causes relational risk by not engaging in 
specific investments, keeping one’s options for alternative partners open, and not surrendering 
information concerning one’s core competencies that may yield a risk of spillover. The price one pays 
for this is lack of depth and commitment in the relation, resulting in low added value by the lost 
opportunity of utilising complementary competencies and cognitive distance. Second, one can try to 
cover risks by formal contracts. However, detailed contracts for safeguarding against opportunism may 
be impossible due to uncertainty (inability to predict and specify all relevant contingencies), too costly, 
or counterproductive by imposing a straight-jacket on the relation or by signalling distrust, which may 
lead to a spiral of regulation and counter-regulation that stifles the relationship. These considerations 
explain the fact, noted long ago by Macauley (1963), that in reality there is only limited use of contracts 
to settle disputes. Third, one can try to govern on the basis of a balance of mutual dependence, the use 
of ‘hostages’ and a reputation mechanism. The notion of a ‘hostage’ derives from TCE. Hostages often 
have the form of sensitive information. A partner may threaten to divulge it to a competitor, as a means 
to impose his will. 
Fourth, one can try to govern on the basis of trust. Trust is a complex and slippery notion, and 
I cannot go into an extensive discussion here (see Nooteboom 2002). One important aspect is the need 
to distinguish between trust in competence and trust in intentions not to engage in opportunism. The one 
requires other safeguards than the other. Trust, defined as the expectation that a partner will not fail in 
competence or intentions, has a range of possible foundations. One is enforcement by authority or 
contract. Another is self-interest, on the basis of direct advantage, reputation or the protection of 
hostages. A more altruistic foundation is an ethic of acceptable conduct, in norms of behaviour. Another 
is personal empathy or friendship, and yet another is routinized behaviour. 
 Fifth, one can employ the services of an intermediary or go-between (Nooteboom 1999b). As 
indicated by TCE, a go-between can help as an arbitrator, in ‘trilateral governance’. It can also help to 
solve the ‘revelation problem’ (assessing the value of especially information before it is paid for), to 
control spillover risk, to mediate in the building and maintenance of trust, and to provide a reputation 
mechanism. The role of intermediaries was recognised before by Shapiro (1987), who called them 
‘guardians of trust’, Zucker (1986), who saw them as part of ‘institutions based trust’, and Fukuyama 
(1995), who called them ‘intermediate communities’. Later, I will discuss these roles of the go-between in 
more detail. 
 Sixth, one can design and utilize network position for the purpose of governance. For 
example, one may limit access of partners to competitors to control spillover, establish centrality in a 
network in order to maintain alternatives, or bridge ‘structural hole’ to obtain leverage. This will also be 
discussed in more detail later. 
 The role of trust, go-betweens and network position may contribute to our understanding of 
regional innovation systems, and I will discuss this later. Here, I emphasize that there is neither a single 
best instrument of governance, nor some fixed recipe for all conditions. One has to craft a mix of 
instruments that fits the contingencies of the situation. Among others, these are: goals of collaboration, 
size and type of economies of scale, type of knowledge (e.g. degree of tacitness), speed at which 
knowledge changes, observability of efforts and accomplishments, institutional support of contract and 
contract execution, institutional conditions of trust, balance of mutual dependence, and intensity of 
competition. The mix of instruments can be complicated. For example, trust and contracts can be 
substitutes but also, and even at the same time, also complements (Klein Woolthuis 1999). 
 The main point here is that when one engages in specific investments, relations must be 
sufficiently durable to recoup them. This includes specific investment in the forms known from TCE, 
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such as location specific investments and specific investments in installations, tools, instruments and 
training. Also, it includes specific investments in the form of developing mutual understanding. i.e. 
crossing cognitive distance, and in the form of building up relation- or network- or region-specific trust. 
Such trust needs to be built up to the extent that it is needed instead of detailed contracts, or as a 
complement to it, and is not in place prior to the relationship. I propose that all this leads to a condition 
that may need to be satisfied for a RIS to function. 
 
RIS4: One condition for a RIS to function is an infrastructure for governance. Well known here is the 
need for legal institutions. However, especially for innovation contracts can be of limited 
value, and there need to be complementary institutions of ethics, behavioural norms, and 
reputation mechanisms. Go-betweens can contribute to such infrastructure. 
   
A certain exclusiveness of relations may be warranted to prevent unwanted spillover of 
competitive advantage to competing firms, networks or regions. It does seem that firms are unduly wary 
of this. Spillover threat is real only when it concerns core competence, can be absorbed, imitated and 
effectively implemented by a competitor, and when the knowledge involved does not shift by the time 
that it is imitated and implemented by a competitor. Nevertheless, the threat of spillover can be real, 
and should then be guarded against. One way to do this is to demand exclusiveness: one’s partner may 
not engage in the same activity with one’s (potential) competitors. The disadvantage of such 
exclusiveness has already been indicated: it reduces variety and distance of cognition.  
  
RIS5: To combine exploitation and exploration, agents in a RIS should craft and maintain relations that 
are sufficiently durable and exclusive as needed for governance, but not more so. Relations 
need to be sufficiently durable to recoup essential specific investments. They may have to be 
exclusive to some extent to limit risks of spillover. However, agents should limit the durability 
of relations and minimize exclusiveness in order to preserve the flexibility needed for the 
Schumpeterian novel combinations of innovation and the cognitive distance needed for 
learning. Go-betweens or specialist consultants, as participants in the RIS, and part of the 
intsitutional set-up, can contribute to this, by means of advice, intermediation or arbitration.    
 
 
4. NETWORKS AND GO-BETWEENS 
 
Important components of the infrastructure for governance are institutions, such as legal frameworks, 
professional standards, and codes of ethics, which are beyond the reach of  agents in a  RIS, and 
primarily lie on a national or supranational level. However, they may be influenced or modified to some 
extent within a RIS. Thus there may be ethical codes, professional or industry associations, and 
reputation mechanisms that are specific to a RIS, as emergent properties that arise from interactions 
between the agents involved. Two instruments for governance that may be brought about in 
collaborative action between public and private agents in a  RIS are network structure and go-betweens. 
Therefore I take a closer look at those.      
One stream of literature on networks suggests that players who span ‘structural holes’ gain 
advantage for themselves (Burt 1992). If individuals or communities A and B are connected only by C, 
then C can take advantage of his bridging position by accessing resources that others cannot access, and 
by playing off A and B against each other. In the context of information exchange, he can, for example, 
threaten to pass sensitive information that he has from A to B and vice versa, and can thereby extract 
advantage from both. As a result, the third party is maximally powerful and minimally constrained in 
his actions. The Latin term for this third party advantage is ‘tertius gaudens’. Krackhardt (1999) pointed 
out that this principle goes back to Simmel (1950). However, Krackhardt shows that from Simmel one 
can also derive the situation that the third party is maximally constrained. This occurs when he bridges 
two different cliques, with dense and strong internal ties, and with different values and norms. The third 
party then has to satisfy the rules or norms of both cliques (the intersection of norm sets). The key 
factor that determines whether the third party is minimally or maximally constrained is the degree to 
which the third party’s actions are public, or at least known to both A and B. If they are not public, then 
the situation described by Burt obtains, and he is minimally constrained. If his actions are public, he is 
maximally constrained. 
 I add the following consideration. So far, the assumption seems to have been that A and B are 
rivals or at the least stand in a substitutive relation: benefit for the one occurs at the expense of the 
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other. If A and B operate in a relationship of collaboration in learning and innovation, with 
complementary cognitive and other competencies, the logic is different. There, the go-between can 
obtain and supply advantage to both A and B by helping them to collaborate. Nevertheless, the earlier 
logic may still apply. The third party, acting as a go-between, may be tempted to exploit his bridging 
position by misleading and extorting A and B. To keep him from doing that, his actions should be 
public, or at least known to both A ad B, so that his reputation is at stake.  
 In collaborative relations, go-betweens can play beneficial roles by facilitating communication, 
reducing the need for specific investments in understanding, reducing risks of spillover, thus creating 
social capital rather than liability for the players they connect (Baker and Obstfeld 1999). More 
specifically, roles of a go-between are to: 
- Provide trilateral governance, as already proposed by TCE: when transactions are small or 
infrequent, it is not worth the cost and effort to set up an extensive scheme for governance, and 
it is more efficient to engage a third party to serve as an arbitrator of a simple, limited contract. 
- Help partners in the art of designing and maintaining collaborative relations, i.e. crafting the 
right mix of instruments for governance. 
- Solve Arrow’s paradox of information or the ‘revelation problem’ in selling information.1 The 
solution here is that the go-between judges the value of the information for the buyer without 
giving him the information.     
- Monitor and control spillover. 
- Serve as a holder of hostages. A problem with hostages is that the taker may be tempted not to 
return the hostage even after the giver has kept his part of the bargain. A go-between acting as 
an independent, non-partisan holder of hostages may not be subject to this temptation.  
- Build up trust and eliminate misunderstandings by which trust may break down without good 
cause. For example, lack of observed performance might be attributed to opportunism, while 
in fact it is due to accident or lack of competence. 
- Facilitate the reputation mechanism, as a sieve and amplifier, by checking accusations of 
opportunistic or incompetent behaviour and transmitting them if correct. 
 
RIS6: One function of a RIS is to provide these roles of the go-between, for the purpose of facilitating 
governance. Institutions must be in place to keep the go-between from misusing his bridging 
position for extortion.  
 
Network position has implications for governance in several ways. Inspiration can be derived 
here from the extensive literature in sociology on network position and structure. Some examples are 
the following:  
- One’s ‘centrality’ in a network: the number of linkages one has relative to others. A large 
number amplifies both potential benefits and liabilities. It can yield large cognitive variety, if 
the cognitive distances involved are sufficiently large. It can yield inertia if the relations are 
too durable and lacking in cognitive distance, and if one has to preserve the interests of 
multiple partners. In particular, it may present spillover risks to new partners and thereby 
constrain one’s access to new partners.  
- As discussed, if one spans ‘structural holes’ in a network, i.e. provides a bridge between 
otherwise ill-connected sub-networks, one can play an important role as an go-between, or one 
can wield power by ‘divide and rule’. 
 
RIS7: In an RIS public and private agents should take into account network structure. In particular, one 
should consider the implictions of centrality and the spanning of structural holes for 
concentration of power, exclusion, entry barriers, etc.     
 
 
5. PROBLEMS IN KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER 
 
Above, it has become clear that cognitive distance, combined with lack of absorptive and 
communicative capacity, yields obstacles for knowledge transfer. It has long been accepted in the 
innovation literature that knowledge transfer is not a matter of simple, linear transfer. Rather, it requires 
an ongoing process of interaction, as in the ‘chain-linked model’ of Kline and Rosenberg (1986). The 
reasons are clear from the above analysis. Novelty by definition cannot readily be absorbed in existing 
absorptive capacity. Transfer of new knowledge requires adjustments in capacities of absorption and 
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communication. The very term ‘transfer’ of knowledge is misleading. That suggests the ‘conduit 
metaphor’ of knowledge, as if knowledge is a physical good transported along a communication 
‘channel’. A ‘food for thought’ metaphor would be more appropriate: in order to yield thought, 
information has to be assimilated in a cognitive interpretation system. Part of knowledge ‘transfer’ is to 
adapt information to that system, on the basis of communicative ability, and to develop the absorptive 
capacity of that system.  
A comment is needed here on the familiar distinction between codified and tacit knowledge. It 
is sometimes suggested that they are distinct and can be separated, in the sense that knowledge can be 
codified without any tacit residual. I do not believe this is the case. When knowledge is ‘externalised’ 
(Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995), reduction takes place: knowledge is disembedded from cognitive 
frameworks or categories that are and remain tacit to some degree. When this is absorbed by the 
recipient, it needs to be absorbed again into his cognitive framework, which entails re-embedding in 
background knowledge that is again to a smaller or larger extent tacit. The transfer of knowledge 
requires sufficient fit between this dis-embedding and re-embedding. This is the issue of crossing 
cognitive distance. To the extent that cognitive frameworks are tacit, mutual understanding may require 
a period of shared practice, in a ‘community of practice’ (Brown and Duguid 1996), in order to 
establish a shared basis of tacit cognitive frameworks, in a ‘epistemic community’ (see the contribution 
from Lissoni, this volume). Once that has been established, the members can disband to communicate at 
a distance, but they will probably have to reconvene periodically to maintain and develop their shared 
cognitive frameworks. 
 
RIS8: A function of a RIS may be to provide a basis of shared tacit knowledge in which imperfectly 
codified knowledge can be embedded and understood correctly (as intended and consistent 
with efficient practice).  
 
 Related to the distinction between tacit and codified knowledge there is a distinction between 
different types of memory. Procedural memory preserves know-how. Declarative memory preserves 
understanding: the ability to specify and explain (Cohen and Bacdayan 1996). This can be illustrated 
with the following example. Having learned a foreign language, with grammar, many years later one 
may be able to judge a given sentence in that language to be ill formed, without being able to explain 
what grammatical rules it violates. The cognitive categories associated with grammar were codified 
when they were absorbed, but have subsided into tacit knowledge. With one’s own mother tongue one 
may be able to make correct judgements without ever having learned the rules. Thus there is a 
distinction between two types of tacit knowledge. In one type, knowledge was never codified and stored 
in declarative memory. In the other type, tacit knowledge was once absorbed as documented knowledge 
into declarative memory, in what Michael Polanyi called ‘focal’ awareness, and then became routinized 
and subsided into ‘subsidiary’ awareness. Discovery by trial and error and craft skills are typically of 
the former type: they are absorbed and transferred in practice without ever having been codified. 
 A problem that is not well recognised in the literature is that there is not only an obstacle in 
knowledge transfer when the knowledge to be transferred is wholly or partly tacit but also when the 
knowledge that it is to replace is tacit. In other words: tacit knowledge reduces absorptive capacity for 
the receiver. As discussed before, it is especially background knowledge, or cognitive categories, that 
tend to be tacit. The deeper or more fundamental categories are, the more tacit they are. One’s own tacit 
knowledge is taken for granted, as self-evident, and is difficult to replace by new knowledge on the 
basis of rational argument. For rational criticism knowledge must first be made explicit, externalized by 
intellectual midwifery or ‘maieutics’. This entails such questioning and answering that the person 
holding the knowledge becomes aware of it and is able to externalize it to a sufficient extent that it can 
become susceptible to rational criticism (Nooteboom 1994). Socrates was a master at it. 
 The point now is that in smaller organizations knowledge tends to be more tacit than in large 
ones. The reason is that co-ordination of work in small ‘simple structures’ (Mintzberg 1983) can be 
based on direct supervision, with the entrepreneur taking part in the primary processes of production, 
on the work floor, transferring tacit knowledge by personal interaction. This makes formal, codified 
forms of co-ordination unnecessary (such as specification of work processes, in- and outputs or skills. 
cf. Mintzberg 1983). This yields potential flexibility as a strength of small firms. It also has 
disadvantages. First, when knowledge is tacit, and embodied in individual people or firms, and was 
never codified, it gets lost when the carriers of knowledge are lost, due to accident, poaching or other 
personnel turnover. Second, tacit knowledge reduces absorptive capacity, as argued above. 
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This yields one of several scale effects in transaction costs (Nooteboom 1993). Other scale 
effects are that there are ‘threshold costs’ (Nooteboom 1987) in transaction costs of contact (search 
costs) and contract, which weigh more heavily at small firm sizes. Furthermore, to the extent that 
knowledge is tacit there is less documentation as a basis for assessment and evaluation of competencies, 
needs, reliability, etc. Note that thus tacit knowledge gives a double jeopardy: less information for 
evaluation and control, and a lesser basis for critical reflection and debate. As discussed, there is limited 
absorptive capacity until tacit knowledge is made explicit, and this is not always possible.  
The analysis explains the familiar phenomenon, identified in the small business literature, of 
how difficult it is to obtain an audience for the adoption of innovations among small firms, and their 
inclination to reject it as ‘impractical’. A complication is that often it is in fact the case that an 
innovation that was developed in or for a large firm does not satisfy the operational conditions of a 
small firm. The point here is that even if it is appropriate, it may still be rejected due to the blindness 
induced by tacit knowledge. 
 
 
6. SOLUTIONS 
 
In the eighties, an advisory committee on technology policy for the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs 
noted that, as indicated above, innovation yields prosperity only if it is diffused widely, and that small 
firms were lagging behind in the adoption of new technology. To remedy this, the committee advised 
the ministry to institute a regional network of what were then called the ‘Innovation Centres’ (now they 
are called ‘Syntens’), for the transfer of technology to small firms, and this advice was implemented. 
One source of inspiration for the centres was the experience in Germany with the Fraunhofer Institute. 
Part of the idea was that the centres should be regionally embedded, as a part of, and hopefully also as a 
motor of RIS. These institutes ran into problems of technology transfer. The preceding analysis and the 
following discussion are informed by experience with this.2 
If tacit knowledge yields an obstacle for the absorption of novelty, what can be done? I noted 
that there are two problems. One problem was that tacit knowledge is self-evident and therefore not 
subject to critical reflection and debate. For that, tacit knowledge first has to be externalized by means 
of intellectual midwifery or maieutics. How is this to be done? A knowledgeable outsider is not credible 
for the very reason that he is subjecting to doubt what for the insider is evident, and thereby he supplies 
nothing but evidence of his incompetence. An approach that has been proven successful in practice is 
the following2. The key insight for it is that only challenge from insiders, i.e. colleagues, is relevant, and 
only evidence from them is credible. The way to do it is to arrange a round-table discussion between 
colleagues, preferably including a few who have already adopted the innovation in question, and act as 
facilitator for them to exchange experience and thereby externalize, at least to some extent, their tacit 
knowledge. The trick is not to participate in the debate but facilitate it. Above all: like Socrates, don’t 
tell other people what to think, but elicit thought that will reveal its own error. For this debate to occur, 
the participants should be sufficiently different not to be direct competitors, and to yield interesting new 
insights, while they should be sufficiently close to make sense to each other. In other words, their 
cognitive distance should be just right.  
Another problem was that for lack of codification tacit knowledge could only be transferred by 
comparatively lengthy, direct, on line, real time interaction, with demonstration, trial, error and 
correction. A remedy then is to transfer knowledge embodied in a worker, who then carries it into the 
firm while practising it, and transfers it on the basis of the ongoing interaction needed. Note that at the 
same time this also solves the previous problem of limited openness to rational criticism. New 
knowledge is assimilated in practice rather than adopted by design. This solution has been applied in 
the Netherlands, in a programme called ‘Knowledge bearers in small and medium sized business 
(KIM)’.3 This programme is an example (one of the few I can think of) of theory preceding and 
informing policy: the arguments for it were as sketched above. The scheme worked as follows. 
Graduates, mainly from polytechnics, could volunteer for the programme, and then followed a crash 
course on the peculiarities of small firms. Entrepreneurs could volunteer, and would receive a subsidy 
of part of the wage costs for a trial period, provided there was a perspective for permanent employment 
of the graduate after the trial period. The regional Innovation Centre counselled the project. A trial 
project in the region of Twente was deemed a success, and the scheme was implemented nationally. A 
secondary purpose of the programme had been to stimulate employment of graduates, among whom 
there was substantial unemployment at the time the programme was started. However, the programme 
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has been maintained for its success after employment increased. Apparently, a similar scheme is now 
under consideration in Denmark. 
Other solutions of problems in the transfer of knowledge are more concerned with issues of 
governance. The Innovation Centres quickly learned that the implementation of technology could not be 
separated from organizational issues, and that the latter had to become part of the expertise of the 
centres. In fact, the business scholars involved in the programme had foreseen this, but the inclusion of 
organizational issues was obstructed from the start by a political problem. There already was a network 
of institutes oriented towards organizational and locational issues of small business. It was problematic 
to infringe on their territory, and integration of those institutes with the new ones was not deemed 
feasible at the start. There already was a problem of rivalry with trade associations who offered help in 
the adoption of innovations on the national level of industries or trades. Integration between the two 
types of institutes did happen later, however, when the organizational issues involved in technology 
transfer became more tangible and evident. In their practice, the Innovation Centres had become aware 
of some of the governance issues involved, as discussed above. My recommendation here is to make 
such intermediaries more explicitly aware of those issues, and to consider the possibility of playing the 
roles of the go-between that were indicated in a previous section. In fact, it turned out that without 
being aware of it they were already performing some of those roles.4 Clearly, it is not easy to perform 
them. The roles require relational skills as well as competence in the technologies and knowledge 
employed by the parties involved. They also require the scrupulous maintenance of a reputation for fair 
dealing.   
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter identified several problems and solutions in the transfer of knowledge, particularly to 
small firms. One problem is that of limited absorptive capacity. This may be limited, in particular, due 
to implicit, tacit knowledge that is taken for granted and not easily susceptible to rational criticism. One 
way to try and solve this problem is to conduct ‘intellectual midwifery’ or maieutics. This may be done 
in the form of a round table-discussion, in which entrepreneurs are stimulated to discuss their work 
practices and thereby externalize their tacit knowledge. A second problem lies in the fact that 
transmission of tacit knowledge requires intensive interaction, which can be time consuming and 
laborious. Then a solution is to transfer the knowledge embedded in new workers joining the firm. 
Other problems concern issues of governance. Here the recommendation is to consider support in the 
form of roles of the ‘go-between’. They can provide ‘trilateral governance’, help overcome the 
‘revelation problem’, assist in the art of crafting a mix of instruments for governance that fits the 
situation, monitor and control spillover, perhaps act as the holder of informational hostages, and 
enhance efficient reputation mechanisms. This yielded one possible function of RIS. Below, an 
overview is given of functions identified for RIS. That list results from the present analysis, and is not 
claimed to exhaust all possible or desirable features of RIS. 
 
1: For a RIS to function (i.e. produce and utilize innovations), it needs to combine exploitation and 
exploration. For the first it needs organizational units that each have sufficient focus to ensure 
efficient utilization of their specialized competencies. For exploration, there should be 
organizational units with cognitive distance that is large enough to ensure variety of cognition 
but not too large to block mutual understanding and relevance. 
2: The performance of a RIS is enhanced by the ability of firms to communicate and to absorb tacit 
knowledge. This enhances the ability to cross cognitive distance. That ability enables one to 
deal with larger cognitive distances. That yields a greater variety of knowledge sources, which 
enhances innovation.  
3: To prevent the disappearance of cognitive distance in the long run, RIS should facilitate the influx of 
new participants in the network or region, relations with units outside the region, or for 
frequent excursions of members of the network or region to other regions, in order to maintain 
cognitive distance. 
4: One condition for a RIS to function is an infrastructure for governance. Well known here is the need 
for legal institutions. However, especially for innovation contracts can be of limited value, and 
there need to be complementary institutions of ethics, behavioural norms, and reputation 
mechanisms. Go-betweens can contribute to such infrastructure.   SEE COMMENTS MADE 
EARLIER ABOUT THIS 
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5: To combine exploitation and exploration, agents in a RIS should craft and maintain relations that are 
sufficiently durable and exclusive as needed for governance, but not more so. Relations need 
to be sufficiently durable to recoup essential specific investments. They may have to be 
exclusive to some extent to limit risks of spillover. However, agents should limit the durability 
of relations and minimize exclusiveness in order to preserve the flexibility needed for the 
Schumpeterian novel combinations of innovation and the cognitive distance needed for 
learning. Go-betweens or specialist consultants, as participants in the RIS, and part of the 
intsitutional set-up, can contribute to this, by means of advice, intermediation or arbitration.    
6: One function of a RIS is to provide these roles of the go-between, for the purpose of facilitating 
governance. Institutions must be in place to keep the go-between from misusing his bridging 
position for extortion.  
7: In an RIS public and private agents should take into account network structure. In particular, one 
should consider the implictions of centrality and the spanning of structural holes for 
concentration of power, exclusion, entry barriers, etc.     
8: A function of a RIS may be to provide a basis of shared tacit knowledge in which imperfectly 
codified knowledge can be embedded and understood correctly (as intended and consistent 
with efficient practice).  
 
This list of potential or desirable features of RIS is aimed, in the first approach, at the 
researcher: these features may help to understand how RIS work and to explain their success or failure. 
The list may also suggest that there is some sort of rational design of RIS, in which these features can 
be configured. But what is governance on the level of a network or RIS? Are RIS entirely a matter of 
self-organization, or can regional authorities have an impact in stimulating useful features? Some of the 
features are obviously more amenable to this than others. 
The question is what set of regional institutions can support the functions indicated. Such 
institutions should be mutually consistent and consistent with supraregional institutions. One has to 
carefully balance intra-regional coherence with intra-regional diversity and extra-regional connections. 
Inter-firm relations should be sufficiently durable to recoup specific investments but not so durable that 
they create rigidities. They should not be more exclusive than absolutely necessary for controlling 
spillover. There should be go-betweens, but those should not be allowed to yield extortion or 
corruption. 
It is not easy to achieve institutional consistency. This is reflected in the current conflict 
between competition policy, which considers any inter-firm collaboration as suspect, and technology 
policy, which tends to stimulate inter-firm relations. This conflict of policy perspectives arises even 
within one ministry of economics, in the Netherlands for example, and is exacerbated by the fact that 
different perspectives in economic science inform the different perspectives. Competition policy tends 
to be informed by mainstream, neo-classical economics, and innovation policy is increasingly informed 
by non-mainstream neo-Schumpeterian evolutionary and institutional economics. Policy debates then 
are in part debates of scientific ideology.  
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1 The revelation problem entails that before one has the information one cannot judge its value and 
hence its price, but when one has it one no longer needs to pay for it. This problem is more acute for 
information than for physical goods. With goods, one can more easily give information to assess the 
goods, or give samples, without surrendering the goods. With information what one gives in advance 
either discloses the information in advance or is of limited usefulness in assessing what is not yet given. 
 
2 Wisse Dekker, former CEO of Philips company, headed the original committee. Subsequently a new 
committee was installed to monitor progress with these and other policy recommendations, and I was a 
member of that committee. 
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2 I developed experience of this when working for an institute for applied policy research for small and 
medium sized business in the Netherlands (EIM), in the late seventies and early eighties.   
 
3 This was developed in the late eighties. I was involved in it as a member of an advisory committee for 
a trial project.  
 
4 This turned during a series of courses that I gave on the design and management of collaborative 
relations to consultants of the institutes, in 1997/98. 
 15
Publications in the ERIM Report Series Research in Management 
 
ERIM Research Program: “Organizing for Performance” 
 
2001 
Employee Perception on Commitment Oriented Work Systems: Effects onTrust and Perceived Job Security 
Paul Boselie, Martijn Hesselink, Jaap Paauwe & Ton van der Wiele 
ERS-2001-02-ORG 
 
The Emergence of a Private Business Sector in China: The Case of Zhejiang 
Barbara Krug & Hans Hendrischke 
ERS-2001-03-ORG 
 
Contingent Employment in the Netherlands 
Ferrie Pot, Bas Koene & Jaap Paauwe 
ERS-2001-04-ORG 
 
Under Construction. (Idendities, Communities and Visual Overkill) 
Slawomir Magala 
ERS-2001-17-ORG 
 
The Dutch Banking Chipcard Game: Understanding a Battle between Two Standards 
Henk J. de Vries & George W.J. Hendrikse 
ERS-2001-18-ORG 
 
Social Structures for Learning 
Irma Bogenrieder & Bart Nooteboom 
ERS-2001-23-ORG 
 
Empirical Evidence for the relation between customer satisfaction and business performance? 
Ton van der Wiele, Paul Boselie & Martijn Hesselink 
ERS-2001-32-ORG 
 
On the emergence of growers’ associations: self-selection versus market power 
G.W.J. Hendrikse & W.J.J. Bijman 
ERS-2001-34-ORG 
 
Employee perceptions of HRM and TQM and the effects on satisfaction and intention to leave 
Paul Boselie & Ton van der Wiele 
ERS-2001-42-ORG 
 
Project Contract Management and a Theory of Organization 
J. Rodney Turner & Stephen J. Simister 
ERS-2001-43-ORG 
 
The Geography of International Strategy: A multi-level framework 
Douglas van den Berghe 
ERS-2001-51-ORG 
 
                                                           
 A complete overview of the ERIM Report Series Research in Management: 
http://www.ers.erim.eur.nl 
 
 ERIM Research Programs: 
 LIS Business Processes, Logistics and Information Systems 
 ORG Organizing for Performance 
 MKT Marketing  
 F&A Finance and Accounting 
 STR Strategy and Entrepreneurship  
  
“The E-Business Research Network”. Summary of the results of the Dutch pilot survey 
Ton van der Wiele, Roger Williams, Jos van Iwaarden, Melanie Wilson & Barrie Dale 
ERS-2001-59-ORG 
 
Cold Wars and Hot Issues. (Management of Responsibilities) 
Dr Slawomir Magala 
ERS-2001-64-ORG 
 
Macro Intentions, Micro Realities: A two-level strategic approach to the single European market 
Alan Muller & Rob van Tulder 
ERS-2001-70-ORG 
 
Learning and Governance in Inter-Firm Relations 
Bart Nooteboom 
ERS-2001-71-ORG 
 
Research in the Management of Learning, Change and Relations: a European Perspective 
Bart Nooteboom 
ERS-2001-72-ORG 
 
The Causality of Supply Relationships: a Comparison between the US, Japan and Europe 
Gjalt de Jong & Bart Nooteboom 
ERS-2001-73-ORG 
 
Problems and Solutions in Knowledge Transfer 
Bart Nooteboom 
ERS-2001-74-ORG 
 
The practice of investment appraisal: An empirical enquiry? 
Mehari Mekonnen Akala & Rodney Turner 
ERS-2001-77-ORG 
 
Investment Appraisal Process: A Case of Chemical Companies 
Mehari Mekonnen Akala & Rodney Turner 
ERS-2001-78-ORG 
 
China Incorporated: Property Rights, Privatisation, and the Emergence of a Private Business Sector in China 
Barbara Krug & Hans Hendrischke 
ERS-2001-81-ORG 
 
Kultur und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in China 
Barbara Krug 
ERS-2001-82-ORG 
 
The Economics of corruption and cronyism – an institutional approach 
Barbara Krug & Hans Hendrischke 
ERS-2001-83-ORG 
 
Combining Commerce and Culture: Establishing Business Relations in China 
Barbara Krug & Frank Belschak 
ERS-2001-84-ORG 
 
 
 
2000  
 
Critical Complexities, from marginal paradigms to learning networks 
Slawomir Magala 
ERS-2000-02-ORG 
 
 ii
Marketing Cooperatives and Financial Structure: a Transaction Costs Economics Analysis 
George W.J. Hendrikse & Cees P. Veerman 
ERS-2000-09-ORG 
 
A Marketing Co-operative as a System of Attributes: A case study of VTN/The Greenery International BV, 
Jos Bijman, George Hendrikse & Cees Veerman 
ERS-2000-10-ORG 
 
Marketing Co-operatives: An Incomplete Contracting Perspective 
George W.J. Hendrikse & Cees P. Veerman 
ERS-2000-13– ORG 
 
Ownership Structure in Agrifood Chains: The Marketing Cooperative 
George W.J. Hendrikse & W.J.J. (Jos) Bijman 
ERS-2000-15-ORG 
 
Organizational Change and Vested Interests 
George W.J. Hendrikse 
ERS-2000-17-ORG 
 
Is Polder-Type Governance Good for You? Laissez-Faire Intervention, Wage Restraint, And Dutch Steel 
Hans Schenk 
ERS-2000-28-ORG 
 
Foundations of a Theory of Social Forms 
László Pólos, Michael T. Hannan & Glenn R. Carroll 
ERS-2000-29-ORG 
 
Reasoning with partial Knowledge 
László Pólos & Michael T. Hannan 
ERS-2000-30-ORG 
 
The Strawberry Growth Underneath the Nettle: The Emergence of Entrepreneurs in China 
Barbara Krug & Lászlo Pólós 
ERS-2000-34-ORG 
 
Trading Virtual Legacies 
Slawomir Magala 
ERS-2000-36-ORG 
 
The Interdependence between Political and Economic Entrepeneurship 
Barbara Krug 
ERS-2000-43-ORG 
 
Ties that bind: The Emergence of Entrepreneurs in China 
Barbara Krug 
ERS-2000-44-ORG 
 
Human Resource Management and Performance: Lessons from the Netherlands 
Paul Boselie, Jaap Paauwe & Paul Jansen 
ERS-2000-46-ORG 
 
Possible futures for the HR function in different market 
Roger Williams, Jaap Paauwe & Anne Keegan 
ERS-2000-54-ORG 
 
Quantity versus Quality in Project Based Learning Practices 
Anne Keegan & J. Rodney Turner 
ERS-2000-55-ORG 
 iii
 
The Management of Innovation in Project Based Firms 
Anne Keegan and J. Rodney Turner 
ERS-2000-57-ORG 
 
Learning by Experience in the Project-Based Organization 
J. Rodney Turner, Anne Keegan & Lynn Crawford 
ERS-2000-58-ORG 
 
 iv
